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ABSTRACT 
 
E-mails occupy an ambiguous space between informal oral 
conversation and formal written documents. Their legal significance in 
contract modification is, however, becoming increasingly clear. In 
April 2008, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, 
decided Stevens v. Publicis, S.A. and in the process, raised the legal 
status of e-mail exchanges in the context of contract modification. 
Before Stevens v. Publicis, S.A., an e-mail could constitute a “signed 
writing” under New York law, thus satisfying the statute of frauds. An 
e-mail exchange could also amend a contract if, for instance, it had 
been validated by the parties’ reliance on it. After Stevens v. Pulicis, 
S.A., e-mails may also satisfy a “no-oral-modification” (NOM) clause—
the contractual obligation to memorialize contract modifications in 
written and signed documents—without requiring additional 
contractual validation. This Article discusses the legal underpinnings 
of this decision and offers practical guidance for attorneys attempting 
to avoid contract modification by e-mail. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Law and society have diverged in their respective perceptions of 
electronic correspondence. For most people, e-mail is an everyday form 
of communication, and a proliferation of e-mails has flooded inboxes 
everywhere. Such volume, coupled with the ability to send, receive, and 
delete e-mail instantaneously, perpetuates an aura of informality akin 
to oral conversation. However, in the legal system, and particularly in 
the context of contract law, e-mails increasingly can and do satisfy 
formal requirements. 
In fact, both state and federal legislatures have legitimized the 
ability of parties to form contracts electronically. In 2000, the Federal 
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act  
(E-SIGN)1 made electronic and paper-and-ink transactions equally 
enforceable for interstate and foreign contracts.2 Many states have also 
adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA),3 which 
                                                                                                             
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001 – 7031 (2006).  
2 Holly K. Towle, Dealing With Contract Formation and Amendment by E-mails, 743 
PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 75, 79-80 (2003) (discussing the impact of e-mails in contract 
modification in general and in Washington State). 
3 ALA. CODE §§ 8-1A-1 to -20 (LexisNexis Supp. 2002); ALASKA STAT. §§ 
09.80.010-.195 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7001 to -7051 (2003 & Supp. 
2009); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-32-101 to -121 (2002 & Supp. 2001); WEST’S ANN. 
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1633.1-.17 (West Supp. 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-
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establishes that electronic and non-electronic records are equal.4 
Unlike E-SIGN, however, under UETA parties must first agree to 
contract electronically before this equivalency will be effective.5 When 
the parties are silent on the issue, such an agreement will be implied by 
their use of e-mail to conduct the transaction.6 
                                                                                                             
71.3-101 to -121 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-266 to -
286 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 12A-101 to -117 (2005 & 
Supp. 2008); D.C. CODE §§ 28-4901 to -4918 (Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
668.50 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 489E-1 to -19 (LexisNexis 
2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-50-101 to -120 (2005); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2-8-
101 to -302 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 554D.101 -.124 
(West 2001 & Supp. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-1601 to -1620 (2000); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 369.101-.120 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
9:2601-2620 (2005 & Supp. 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 9401-9507 
(2009); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 21-101 to -120 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 
2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325L.01-.19 (West 2000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110G 
§§ 1-18 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.831-.849 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325L.01-.19 (West 2004 & Supp. 
2010); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-12-1 to -39 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); MO. ANN. 
STAT. §§ 432.200-.295 (West Supp. 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-18-101 to -118 
(2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86-612 to -643 (LexisNexis 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§§ 719.010-.350 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 294-E:1-20 (Supp. 2009); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:12-1 to -26 (West 2004 & Supp.2009); N.M. STAT. §§ 14-16-1 to -
19 (2003 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-311 to -339 (2009); N.D. CENT. 
CODE §§ 9-16-01 to -18 (2006 & Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1306.1-.23 
(LexisNexis 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 15-101 to -121 (West 2001 & 
Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 84.001-.061 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); 73 PA. 
CONS. STAT. §§ 2260.101-.903 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-
127.1-1 to -20 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 26-6-10 to -210 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 53-12-1 to -50 (2004 & Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-10-101 to -123 
(2001 & Supp. 2009); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 322.001-.021 (Vernon 
2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-4-101 to -503 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9, §§ 270-290 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-479 to -497 (2006 & Supp. 
2009); W. VA. CODE §§ 39A-1-1 to -17 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2009); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 137.11-.26 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-21-101 to -119 (2009). 
4 See Robert A. Wittie & Jane K. Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures under the 
Federal E-SIGN Legislation and the UETA, 56. BUS. LAW 293, 294-95 (2000). 
5 Towle, supra note 2, at 81. 
6 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 5, cmt. 4, 7A U.L.A. 211 (West 2002 & 
Supp. 2009).  
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Courts seem to follow the lead of these statutes when parties 
attempt to form or modify a contract by e-mail: the parties’ intent 
governs, regardless of medium. Under common law, parties generally 
may form or modify contracts by e-mail—even if there is a statutory or 
contractually imposed writing requirement—so long as all the requisite 
elements of contract formation are present in the e-mail exchange.7 
Despite the statutory and common law authority for electronic 
transactions, most jurisdictions have yet to address the ability of 
electronic correspondence to effectively modify a contract when the 
parties’ initial transaction is not electronic and the parties expressly 
include a clause that requires all modifications be memorialized in a 
written and signed document. Such a clause is often called a “no-oral-
modification” (NOM) clause because it includes a provision prohi-
biting oral modification in addition to requiring a signed writing.8 In 
                                                                                                             
7 Whether or not a statute of frauds has been satisfied requires inquiry into 
contract formation or modification, which in turn hinges on the parties’ intent. The 
inquiry is therefore fact-specific. Statutes of frauds generally do not require merely 
writing, but rather a writing that memorializes the contract. Thus many cases find 
that an e-mail satisfies a statute of frauds writing requirement, but not the statute of 
frauds. Compare Lamle v. Mattel, Inc. 394 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (applying 
California law to hold that an e-mail constitutes a writing and signature to satisfy 
California’s statute of frauds if the e-mail includes all material terms) with Toghiyany 
v. AmeriGas Propane, Inc. 309 F.3d 1088, 1091 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that e-mails 
and a draft agreement did not satisfy Missouri’s statute of frauds because they were 
not signed and did not include a durational term, which is an essential element) with 
Smith v. Int’l Paper Co., 87 F.3d 245, 247 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding an e-mail that 
does not contain an offer or acceptance does not satisfy the statute of frauds); and 
Illinois Light Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 235 F. Supp. 2d 916, 921 (C.D. Ill. 
2002) (holding a series of e-mails did not satisfy the statute of frauds because they 
clearly indicated the parties were negotiating). For a more comprehensive discussion 
of cases, see John E. Theuman, Satisfaction of Statute of Frauds by E-Mail, 110 
A.L.R.5th 277 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (collecting cases finding e-mails either 
sufficient or insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds writing and signature 
requirements).  
8 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (9th ed. 2009). For a discussion of NOM 
clauses in private contracts see RICHARD A. LORD, 10 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 
29:42 (4th ed. 2009); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 2 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.6 
(3d ed. 2004). NOM clauses have often been termed private statutes of frauds, and 
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general, a NOM clause reflects the parties’ intent to be bound by 
modifications only after a final formalized document has been 
executed, and not by the informal communications that may precede 
it, such as those that occur during negotiations. Yet even when there is 
a NOM clause, circumstances may dictate that the contract can be 
amended, regardless of the medium or the medium’s formality.9 
Moreover, even a NOM clause may be modified orally if the parties 
intended to do so.10 
A few states have implemented statutes requiring that courts 
disallow such oral modification and give effect to NOM clauses.11 For 
example, New York has enacted a law stating that where a contract 
“contains a provision to the effect that it cannot be changed orally,” 
the contract cannot be modified by an executory agreement unless it is 
in a signed writing.12 This statute places New York courts in a position 
to address whether, in the context of contract modification, an 
electronic correspondence can constitute a signed writing sufficient to 
satisfy a NOM clause. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate 
Division, decided this very issue in Stevens v. Publicis, S.A., and held 
that a series of e-mails between the contracting parties satisfied the 
                                                                                                             
thus been analogized sections 2-201 and 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.), which provides for NOM clauses in commercial contracts between 
merchants. For a discussion of a NOM in the U.C.C.’s context see Frank A. 
Rothermel, Comment, Role of Course of Performance and Confirmatory Memoranda in 
Determining the Scope, Operation and Effect of “No Oral Modification” Clauses, 48 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 1239 (1987). 
9 See, e.g., Alcon v. Kinton Realty Inc. 2 A.D.2d 454, 456 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956) 
(“That a written contract may thus be effectively modified, even when it contains a 
stipulation against oral modification, has long been established. As was said by Judge 
Cardozo… ‘Those who make a contract may unmake it. The clause which forbids a 
change may be changed like any other.’” (quoting Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration 
Co., 122 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1919) superseded by statute as stated by Israel v. Chabra, 906 
N.E.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. 2009))). 
10 See id. 
11 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-301(1) (McKinney 2010). See also, TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 47-50-112(c) (2001); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1698(c) (West 1985); MONT. CODE 
ANN. §28-2-1602 (2009). 
12 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-301(1) (McKinney 2010). 
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NOM clause in the parties’ employment agreement.13 This Article will 
first explore the context of the Stevens decision by comparing contract 
modification under New York law to the common law of contract 
modification. It will then discuss the Stevens case and decision. Finally, 
this Article will explore the implications of Stevens for preventing 
contract modification by e-mail. 
 
I. CONTRACT MODIFICATION IN NEW YORK 
 
Under the common law rule, a contract subject to a statute of 
frauds writing requirement generally could not be modified by an oral, 
executory agreement absent consideration14 unless certain exceptions 
apply, such as reliance on the modification.15 However, New York has 
modified the traditional common law rule by implementing three 
statutes in chapter 24-A of its General Obligations Law: sections 15-
301, 5-1103 and 5-701. Section 5-1103 allows a contract to be 
modified, even without consideration, as long as there is a signed 
writing.16 Thus, this statute is implicated in contracts that contain 
                                                                                                             
13 Stevens v. Publicis, S.A., 50 A.D.3d 253, 255 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) leave to 
appeal dismissed, 892 N.E.2d 399 (N.Y. 2008). 
14 See RICHARD A. LORD, 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:8 (4th ed. 2009) (“It 
is therefore generally true that promises, in order to be enforceable, need 
consideration.”). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981) 
(setting forth the general rule that “If the requirement of consideration is met, there 
is no additional requirement of (a) a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a 
loss, disadvantage, or detriment to the promisee; or (b) equivalence in the values 
exchanged; or (c) ‘mutuality of obligation.’”) 
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981) (allowing for three 
instances when modification of a contract that has not been fully performed becomes 
binding: (1) if it would be “fair and equitable” in light of changed circumstances; (2) 
if authorized by statute; and (3) if justice would so require because of a “material 
change of position in reliance.”). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
89 cmt. a (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 149(2) (1981) (“The 
Statute of Frauds may prevent enforcement in the absence of reliance.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 150 (1981) (stating that even if the 
statute of frauds is applicable, the contract may be modified orally if there has been 
“a material change of position in reliance” on the oral modification). 
16 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1103 (McKinney 2010). 
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NOM clauses insofar as they require a signed writing to effect 
modification. As mentioned, section 15-301 mandates court enforce-
ment of NOM clauses.17 Since section 15-301 reinforces a NOM’s 
signed writing requirement by requiring that courts give effect to NOM 
clauses,18 sections 5-1103 and 15-301, taken together, ensure that a 
signed writing may modify a contract with a NOM clause regardless of 
whether consideration is provided. 
New York’s general statute of frauds, codified in section 5-701,19 
also plays a role in the enforcement of NOM clauses in New York. The 
purpose of the signature requirement in section 15-301 is to authen-
ticate assent to proposed modifications.20 In a similar vein, section  
5-701, as a statute of frauds, requires that certain contracts be 
memorialized in a signed writing21 and shares this authentication 
purpose, albeit at contract formation.22 Courts in New York have 
drawn on precedent construing section 5-701 by analogy when 
interpreting the signature requirement in section 15-301.23 Thus, 
                                                                                                             
17 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-301 (McKinney 2010). 
18 Id.  
19 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 2010). 
20 See Israel v. Chabra, 537 F.3d 86, 100 (2nd Cir. 2008), certified question 
answered, 906 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y. 2009), vacated to conform to answer to certified question, 
601 F.3d 57 (2nd Cir. 2010) (noting the purpose of section 15-301(1) was “to assure 
the authenticity of an amendatory agreement; thus, the statute requires the dignity of 
a formal writing to insure the validity and genuineness of a contractual 
modification.” (citing DFI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Greenberg, 363 N.E.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. 
1977))). 
21 Id. 
22 See Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co., Inc. v. Estate of Short, 663 N.E.2d 633, 
634 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that a name automatically printed on a facsimile does not 
satisfy the statute of frauds requirement because doing so does not evince a present 
intent to authenticate the document’s contents). 
23 See, e.g., DFI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Greenberg, 363 N.E.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. 1977) 
(distinguishing the statutes, but also recognizing their similar purpose in holding that 
signed meeting minutes may be sufficient to satisfy sections 15-301 and 5-701). See 
also Rochester Cmty. Individual Practice Ass’n v. Finger Lakes Health Ins. Co., 281 
A.D.2d 977, 978 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (drawing on Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble 
Co., Inc. v. Estate of Short, 663 N.E.2d 633, 634 (N.Y. 1996) to interpret section  
5-701 to construe section 15-301). 
7
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section 15-301 coupled with the jurisprudence interpreting New York’s 
statute of frauds effectively prevents modification without a signed 
writing. 24 
There are, however, ways around a NOM’s writing requirement, 
even when such statutes mandate enforcement. Again, under common 
law, a contract without a NOM clause can be modified orally without 
consideration and without a signed writing if there is reliance.25 If the 
contract has a NOM clause, the parties must have both relied on the 
contract modification and waived the writing requirement. Generally, 
oral attempts to modify a contract may waive a statutorily imposed 
writing requirement such as the statute of frauds.26 However, even if 
the writing requirement is waived by oral attempts to modify, the 
contract will not be modified unless there is also reliance.27 Indeed, in 
construing 15-301, New York courts have added that, to waive the 
NOM clause, an attempt to orally modify must be accompanied by 
reliance.28 
Often, attempts at contract modification are accompanied by 
reliance. In these situations, the issue of whether an e-mail exchange is 
a writing that satisfies a NOM clause is irrelevant because the writing 
requirement has been waived.29 In fact, courts in New York30 and 
                                                                                                             
24 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 2010). 
25 See supra note 15.  
26 RICHARD A. LORD, 10 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 29:42 (4th ed. 2009) 
(discussing whether an attempt to modify alone is sufficient, or whether reliance is 
also necessary). Cf. RICHARD A. LORD, 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:38 (4th ed. 
2009) (discussing contract modification in the sale-of-goods context under the 
U.C.C.). 
27 RICHARD A. LORD, 10 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 29:42 (4th ed. 2009); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 (1981). 
28 See, e.g., The Savage is Loose Co. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 413 
F. Supp. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (requiring reliance based on oral modification in 
order to effectively waive a NOM clause and modify a contract).  
29 RICHARD A. LORD, 10 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 29:42 (4th ed. 2009). 
30 See, e.g., The Savage is Loose Co. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 413 
F. Supp. 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (requiring reliance on oral statements to modify a 
contract, although the oral statements themselves waive the writing requirement); 
Canizaro v. Mobile Commc’ns Corp. of America, 655 So. 2d 25, 30 (Miss. 1995) 
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elsewhere allow modification—regardless of the medium—when an 
attempt to modify is accompanied by reliance.31 In New York, 
however, an attempt to modify alone, absent reliance, does not 
necessarily waive the NOM clause. To overcome a NOM clause and 
effectively modify the contract, an e-mail exchange must be deemed a 
writing with sufficient formality to satisfy section 15-301 and therefore 
the statute of frauds. 
 
II. STEVENS V. PUBLICIS: E-MAIL CAN SATISFY A NOM CLAUSE 
 
In Stevens, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in a 
succinct slip opinion, held that a series of e-mails between contracting 
parties satisfied the requirements of an enforceable NOM clause, even 
without waiver or reliance.32 The result dispels the aura of informality 
surrounding e-mails and presumes they are signed writings. The Stevens 
decision suggests that to avoid modification by e-mail, contracting 
parties should include “no e-mail modification” (NEM) clauses in their 
contracts.33 
The events that precipitated Stevens v. Publicis, S.A. began when 
Publicis, S.A. (Publicis) purchased Arthur Stevens’ public relations 
firm, Lobsenz-Stevens.34 The parties entered into both an employment 
contract and a stock purchase agreement (SPA).35 Under the employ-
ment contract, Stevens was to remain as CEO for three years.36 The 
                                                                                                             
(noting that oral modification was effective, and waived a NOM clause when there 
was reliance, and analogizing the situation to statutory NOM clauses as exemplified 
by section 2-209 of the U.C.C.); Varnell v. Henry M. Milgrom, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 616, 
619 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (requiring both oral statements and conduct indicating 
reliance on those statements to modify a contract subject to the U.C.C.’s statute of 
frauds writing requirement). 
31 RICHARD A. LORD, 10 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 29:42 (4th ed. 2009). 
32 Stevens, 50 A.D.3d at 256. 
33 See Towle, supra note 2, at 78-79 (suggesting that parties wishing to avoid 
contract modification by e-mail may be well advised to include a notice to that effect 
in the contract and possibly in their e-mails). 
34 Stevens, 50 A.D.3d at 254. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
9
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SPA correspondingly provided Stevens with performance incentives via 
an earn-out provision that increased the purchase price of the stocks 
that Publicis would buy from Stevens based upon the firm’s success 
over those three years.37 The employment contract had a NOM clause 
expressly stating that any amendments had to be memorialized in a 
written and signed document.38  
After six months, the company’s business stalled and Stevens was 
relieved of his position as CEO.39 Pending his removal, Stevens 
exchanged a series of e-mails with an executive at Publicis.40 The  
e-mails proposed that Stevens continue to work at the firm, but 
detailed a new job description, which Stevens clarified and then 
accepted by e-mail.41 Stevens later sued Publicis for breaching the 
employment contract by removing him from his position as CEO 
before the three-year earn-out period had ended.42 
Stevens asserted that the e-mail exchange did not effectively modify 
his employment contract because the e-mails neither explicitly referred 
to the contract, nor declared that they would constitute a modification 
to the employment contract.43 He argued that absent unequivocal 
expressions of both parties’ intent to contract by e-mail, the exchange 
could not overcome the contractual requirement that modifications be 
formalized in a signed writing.44 The court disagreed and, without 
clarifying its rationale in detail, stated that an e-mail constitutes a 
signed writing sufficient to satisfy both the statute of frauds and the 
employment contract’s clause requiring a signed writing for modi-
fication.45 
                                                                                                             
37 Id. 
38 Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 30, Stevens v. Publicis, S.A., 50 A.D.3d 253 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (No. 602716/03). 
39 Id. 
40 Stevens, 50 A.D.3d at 254-55. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 254. 
43 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 33, Stevens v. Publicis, S.A., 50 A.D.3d 253 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (No. 602716/03). 
44 Id. 
45 Stevens, 50 A.D.3d at 255-56. 
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The court relied on the New York case Rosenfeld v. Zerneck,46 which 
interprets the statute of frauds requirements under section 5-701.47 In 
Rosenfeld, the New York Supreme Court held that the statute of frauds’ 
“signed writing” requirement may be satisfied by e-mail.48 In Rosenfeld, 
the defendant used e-mail to accept an oral offer to sell real property 
and indicate that his attorney would “prepare a contract of sale.”49 
Although this language suggests intent to contract, it also implies a 
subjective belief that the parties would not be bound until a formal 
written contract had been drafted and signed. Nonetheless, the court 
in Rosenfeld stated that if the e-mail exchange had included all vital 
contract terms, it would have enforced the e-mail contract.50 The 
Stevens Court used the Rosenfeld decision to support the proposition 
that an e-mail is a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds.51 
Therefore, an e-mail may also satisfy the writing requirement of the 
NOM as enforced by section 15-301.  
The “signature” requirement of the NOM clause was deemed 
satisfied in Stevens by the parties’ typed names at the end of each  
e-mail.52 The court did not cite any authority for this assertion, 
although it followed directly after a discussion of Rosenfeld, where the 
court did find that a typed signature on an e-mail satisfied the 
signature requirement of the statute of frauds.53 The Rosenfeld Court 
                                                                                                             
46 4 Misc. 3d 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
47 Stevens, 50 A.D.3d at 255-56 (citing Rosenfeld, 4 Misc.3d at 195). See also Bazak 
Int’l Corp. Tarrant Apparel Group, 378 F. Supp.2d 377, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(finding that an e-mail exchange satisfies the statute of frauds for sections 2-201 and 
2-209 of New York’s U.C.C.). But see Vista Developers Corp. v. VFP Realty, LLC, 17 
Misc. 3d 914, 920-21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (holding that section 5-703 of New York’s 
General Obligations Law governs contracts for the sale of real property and under 
this provision an e-mail exchange is not sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds’ 
writing requirement). 
48 Rosenfeld, 4 Misc. 3d at 194. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 196. 
51 Stevens, 50 A.D.3d at 255-56. 
52 Id. 
53 Rosenfeld, 4 Misc. 3d at 195 (distinguishing Parma Tile Mosaic & Marble Co. 
v. Estate of Short, 663 N.E.2d 633 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996), where a fax transmission 
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decided that, since the name on the e-mail was intentionally typed, it 
clearly indicated intent to authenticate.54 The Stevens Court again 
seemed to extend the Rosenfeld holding on the statute of frauds to 
NOM clauses, and infer that the intent to authenticate for statute of 
fraud purposes was the same intent required to satisfy a NOM clause.55 
The Stevens Court did not explicitly extend the holding to contracts 
containing NOM clauses, although that is the effect of the decision.56 
Moreover, the Stevens decision could be broader in that an e-mail can 
satisfy both statutorily imposed formal writing requirements and those 
imposed by contractual clauses. Further, the Stevens decision indicates 
that NOM clauses may not bar unintended contracting by e-mail. On 
the other hand, the effect of the holding may be limited to New York 
law. Still, the decision reflects a trend in favor of electronic contract-
ing.57 Contract drafters must use particular care to avoid contract 
modification by e-mail—if that is their intent. 
 
III. HOW TO PREVENT MODIFICATION BY E-MAIL 
 
The most obvious lesson to be drawn from the Stevens decision is 
that a clause stating that all modifications to a contract must be in 
writing—or even a “signed” writing—does not necessarily preclude 
amendment via e-mail. A NOM clause may not be sufficient to prevent 
contract modification by e-mail unless the parties expressly state their 
intention to not be bound by e-mail amendments or expressly define 
the manner of contract modification. 
 
                                                                                                             
that automatically put the sender’s name on each page did not meet the signature 
requirement for the statute of frauds). 
54 Id. at 195-96. 
55 Stevens, 50 A.D.3d at 256. 
56 Stevens, 50 A.D.3d at 255-56. 
57 See Anita Ramasastry, A New York Appellate Court Holds That an Email Message 
Can Amend an Employment Contract: Why the Decision Was Correct, and What it Means 
for Employees, FINDLAW, May 29, 2008, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/ramasastry/ 
20080529.html. For a discussion of the trend toward enforcing electronic contract 
formation and modification see Wittie & Winn, supra note 4, at 294-95. 
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A.  Explicitly State Intent Not to be Bound by E-Mail Amendments 
 
Courts in New York have enforced NOM clauses pursuant to 
section 15-301.58 Moreover, courts are likely to uphold NOM clauses if 
viewed as expressions of the parties’ intent not to contract orally.59 
Therefore, Stevens illustrates the wisdom of including an explicit 
expression of intent not to contract by e-mail: in essence, a “no e-mail 
modification” (NEM) clause.60 Besides using a NEM clause, parties 
may use several other drafting techniques to prevent e-mail 
modification. For instance, the contract may also enumerate the proce-
dures necessary to effectively amend it, and specifically exclude e-mails 
as an acceptable means of satisfying a NOM clause. The contract may 
also include a statement defining a signed writing as a “handwritten 
(not electronic) signature.” 
Paradoxically, in the absence of a NEM clause, a court may actually 
be inclined to favor modification by e-mail. Courts prefer accurate 
manifestations of parties’ intent over the formalities of written 
contracts.61 Therefore, courts often favor handwritten or typed 
documents over pre-printed ones, since the former are more likely to 
reflect true intent, and less likely to contain boilerplate language.62 As a 
                                                                                                             
58 See, e.g., Lewis v. Rahman, 147 F. Supp.2d 225, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing 
section 15-301 to assert that “[w]here, as here, the contract to be modified provides 
that all modifications must be in writing, a purported oral modification violates the 
Statute of Frauds.”). But see Rose v. Spa Realty Assocs., 366 N.E.2d 1279, 1282-83 
(N.Y. 1977) (noting that when the only proof of modification is the oral exchange 
itself, the NOM will be enforced, but if the oral modification has been acted upon—
in other words, if there is reliance—then the oral modification may be effective). 
59 See, e.g., CrossLand Fed. Sav. Bank by F.D.I.C. v. A. Suna & Co., Inc., 935 F. 
Supp. 184, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that “[w]here the parties have demonstrated 
an intent not to be bound until they have executed a formal contract, they cannot be 
bound until the writing is complete.”). 
60 See also Towle, supra note 2, at 91 (noting that “no one is forced to deal 
electronically if they do not want to, at least as to general contractual matters.”). 
61 See ROBERT A. FELDMAN & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, DRAFTING EFFECTIVE 
CONTRACTS: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, § 1.03A[B] (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2008). 
62 See also, e.g., Patel v. United Inns Inc., 887 N.E.2d 139, 148-49 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008), transfer dismissed, 887 N.E.2d 139 (Ind. 2009) (stating that “[w]hen construing 
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result, e-mails may potentially be given additional weight because they 
are perceived as less formal.63 
 
B.  Make the Manner of Modification Explicit 
 
If including NEM clauses in contracts and appending disclaimers 
to e-mails becomes routine, however, courts might eventually consider 
their language boilerplate as well.64 If this occurs, then courts are likely 
to treat NEM clauses and other disclaimers as they do NOM clauses: 
overlook them when the e-mails indicate intent to contract or when 
other special circumstances, such as reliance, are present. Such a result 
may be avoided with explicit statements of what will or will not 
effectively modify the contract, both at the outset of contract 
formation and during negotiations for a modification itself. At 
contract formation, this explicit statement could simply be a written 
statement in the contract describing the manner or procedures for 
modification. During contract amendment negotiations, the issue 
could be addressed in multiple ways. For instance, a disclaimer stating 
                                                                                                             
a contract where there is apparent conflict, handwriting prevails over typewriting.” In 
footnote 3, the court also notes that handwritten terms are favored because “there is 
a presumption that the handwritten terms were more actively negotiated between the 
parties, and, therefore, that those terms best reflect the parties’ intent.” The court 
cites State v. Scott Constr. Co., 174 N.E. 429, 431 (Ind.Ct. App. 1931) and Sprague 
Elec. Co. v. Bd. Comm’rs Hennepin County, 86 N.W. 332, 333 (Minn. 1901) to 
support this assertion). 
63 See, e.g., Otto Interiors, Inc. v. Nestor, 196 Misc.2d 48, 50 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
2003) (finding that a typewritten provision was preferable to a printed form because 
it was a truer reflection of the parties intentions) (citing Lanni v. Smith, 89 A.D.2d 
782, 783 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)); see also, Ganisin v. Noeth, 163 A.D.2d 828, 829 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (“By setting forth the method by which the contract may be 
amended, to wit, by a writing, it implies the preclusion of other less formal methods 
of amendment.”) 
64 Chicago Inv Corp. v. Dolins, 481 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ill. 1985) (characterizing a 
provision in letters of intent exchanged by the parties, which provided that a formal 
document would be executed, as “mere recitation”— particularly when there was 
evidence that the parties intended to be bound by the terms of those letters. 
However, the court also noted that “parties may specifically provide that negotiations 
are not binding until a formal agreement is in fact executed.”). 
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the sender’s intent not to modify the contract could be included in the 
body of every e-mail. Since modifications are themselves specifically 
negotiated, such statements included within them are unlikely to be 
perceived as boilerplate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Stevens v. Publicis, S.A. raises electronic correspondence to the level 
of a formal, signed writing in New York. The case signals that e-mails 
may be treated as written, signed documents—even when the parties’ 
do not express intent to treat them as such. In addition, statutory 
legitimization of electronic contracting, common law precedents 
allowing contract formation and modification by e-mail , and common 
law precedents upholding the sufficiency of an e-mail as a signed 
writing for statute of frauds purposes all suggest that Stevens is part of a 
trend towards making e-mails the formal equivalent to paper and ink. 
To avoid being bound by e-mailed conversations, it is important not 
only to exercise caution in e-mailing, but also in drafting and 
negotiating contracts at the outset to expressly deal with e-mail as a 
possible method of modification. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Standard “no-oral-modification” (NOM) clauses may be insuffi-
cient to prevent contract modification via e-mail. 
 Parties should explicitly state in their contract that amendments 
cannot be made by electronic correspondence or that a signed 
writing requires a handwritten—not electronic—signature. 
 Where parties are discussing possible amendments to an existing 
contract via e-mail, disclaimers should be included in the text of 
such e-mails indicating that the correspondence does not satisfy 
the NOM clause or constitute an amendment to the contract. 
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